Friday 25 May 2012

Do Bonuses Work? – Money, Money, Money

The debate over whether bonuses are justified is highly controversial. At the heart of the issue is whether bonuses are effective. This blog will explore one particular sense in which bonuses could be effective: overcoming ‘coordination failure’.

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Coordination failure is where everyone could be better off if they coordinated on their actions, but for some reason they aren't. For example, a factory assembly line can only ever go at the speed of the slowest worker. Working faster than anyone else is just a waste of effort and so workers have an incentive to work at the speed of the slowest. Jordi Brandts and David J. Cooper (AER, 2006) did an experiment to test whether bonuses could help the workers coordinate on a faster speed.

They define coordination failure as being “trapped in situations that are unsatisfactory for all involved, even though preferable outcomes are possible” (p.669).

The experiment was designed as follows. Subjects were put into groups of four called ‘firms’. They each decided how much ‘effort’ to put in, with each bit of effort costing them a small amount of money (to represent that effort is not effortless in the real world). They each received a flat wage plus a percentage of the firm’s ‘profits’. However, the firm's profits depended on the lowest effort level that any of the 4 workers puts in. The best outcome for everyone is when all the workers put in maximum effort. Each worker faces the following dilemma: it never pays to put in more effort than anyone else, but it always worth having a more profitable firm. 

http://static.ddmcdn.com/gif/automotive-production-line-1.jpg

Brandts and Cooper then varied the percentage of firms’ profits that workers received. An increase was called a ‘bonus’. They tested different sizes of bonus to see if suddenly increasing it raised effort.

They found that “subjects respond positively to an increase in the bonus rate, but larger increases do not yield larger responses” (p.680). So bonuses were a good focal point (or trigger) for increased effort, but effort upsurges were not proportional to the size of the bonus. They also found that subsequently reducing the bonus rate did not cause effort levels to fall again.

Thus Brandts and Cooper conclude that a small temporary increase in the financial rewards can overcome a history of coordination failure.

However, there are caveats. While the experiment was well-designed, it still claims a lot of external validity for a laboratory experiment. The financial incentives for subjects were small: over the course of the experiment few subjects would have earned over £15. Also, it only shows bonuses can work in groups of 4.

http://i.i.com.com/cnwk.1d/i/ne/p/2008/positivo-production-line_550x367.jpg

Crucially, as Brandts and Cooper recognise, “it seems likely that other coordination devices [such as management communication] might also be quite effective in overcoming coordination failure” (p.689). 

Thus it would seem that bonuses can have a sudden positive impact upon effort levels of a team who were previously not coordinating well. However, other ways may be just as effective. 

Importantly, this does not justify huge bonuses for CEOs. The idea behind huge CEO bonuses is that they motivate other employees to work hard to one day become CEO. (Whether this is a good idea will have to be the subject of another blog.)

More importantly, is money really the best way to motivate people? Are humans more complex than simple money driven machines?

Relevant listening:
Money, Money, Money by Abba

Monday 21 May 2012

Opposition - The Imperial March

"There are ongoing disputes about what economics should learn from experimental results, about whether (or in what sense) economic theory can be tested in laboratory experiments, and about how far traditional theory needs to be adapted in the light of experimental results."

- Bardsley et al. (2010, p.1)

The Nottingham lab - http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lezorsee/img/lab.jpg


I've recently being doing some research into common objections to the use of experiments in economics. Here follows a brief summary...

Bardsley et al. (2010, p.9) explain a paper by Ken Binmore (1999): "Economic theory, he argues, can reasonably be expected to apply only under particular conditions..." (i.e. putting people in a special room and telling them they can't communicate with anyone else is unrealistic).

Bardsley et al. (2010, p.10) also summarise a paper by Steven Levitt (Freakanomics co-author) and John List (2007): "Levitt and List point out that, in many of the environments studied by economists, decision makers are not a representative sample of the population." (i.e. stock brokers are not stock brokers because they got chosen at random, but because they want to be stock brokers and are good at it). A potential problem as economists tend to select their subjects at random, rather than specially get in stock brokers etc.


http://bellarmine2.lmu.edu/econlab/inside.jpg

Vernon Smith (Nobel prize winner) notes a different issue with experiments. By their very nature experiments have underlying assumptions. These assumptions can always be contested (not always legitimately). Thus any experimental conclusion can be contested. This "denies the possibility of direct falsification of any specific testable implication of a theory" (1994, p.127).

On a related note, according to Alvin Roth (1988, p.1023) "the major pitfall to be aware of here is that... there is room for an experimenter's prior beliefs about the likely outcome of the experiment to influence the outcome, through these design decisions."

Roth concludes that "The danger is of inadvertently reading experimental evidence as supporting an overly general conclusion on observations made in special cases." (p.1023)

Despite all this, many of the above objections can be answered (another blog etc etc). Therefore, I still believe that experiments can shed valuable light upon economic theories. And by dealing with the citicisms experimental economics improves in both accuracy and validity. Obviously there are flaws (as with any method of study), but let's not throw the baby out with the over-used metaphor.


Recommended listening:
The Imperial March by John Williams




Key references:

Bardsley, N., R. Cubitt, G. Loomes, P. Moffatt, C. Starmer and R. Sugden (2010)  Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules  
Smith, V. L. (1994) "Economics in the Laboratory" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 113-31 

Roth, A. (1988)  "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview", Economic Journal,  974-1031.

Thursday 17 May 2012

Facebook Mania – I’m Forever Blowing Bubbles

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjI0NZRrjuhyW0_mSyzpMty34Bx6ewdgiB-GUgd472D9-lclQaq7NXQKjdGRjxrDTz8-e4CjqG1Jum24nVGM18u8nuosq0YEpG5dw52GXKp0HDDprrQ_sZt4yezwkbl6nIDQ2MtYFZcVHQ/s320/Facebook-icon.png

According to the BBC, last year Facebook generated $1bn in profits. It’s stock market valuation is looking like it’ll value the company at $100bn. Surely, that is the dictionary definition of over-confidence. Facebook would have to increase profits ten-fold to even start to justify the $100bn price tag. 

Facebook already has a staggering 900 million users: any jump in profits will have to come from a new business strategy (as opposed to increasing market share). Facebook’s strategy so far seems to be built on the assumption that profitability is purely a function of market share. In fairness, this has been hugely successful (I wouldn’t say no to a $1bn annual profit). But I fear that the traditional toxic mix of herd behaviour and short memory is at play once again.

People follow the herd. If the herd starts investing in Facebook in big numbers it encourages others to do the same. Surely all those people can’t be wrong??

People have short memories. Remember the last technology bubble? The dotcom boom? If you’re anything like me that seems centuries ago (when people were stupid, unlike now).

If I was a betting man (and had any money) I would be betting against Facebook BIG time. I cannot see how their shares can do anything but fall in price. It may take a while for reality to hit home, but reality never stays away forever.




Recommended listening:
I’m Forever Blowing Bubbles by West Ham United

Motivational Money

A really interesting take on whether money actually motivates us..


Created by the RSA from a Dan Pink lecture.

More of their stuff available here: http://comment.rsablogs.org.uk/videos/

See my previous blog What Motivates You? - The Bad, The Ugly and The Good for a very brief overview of the traditional economic view of motivation:

http://guruhogg.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/what-motivates-you-bad-ugly-and-good.html

Wednesday 16 May 2012

That’s Just Not Cricket – It’s The End Of The World As We Know It

Something quite unexpected happened to me this afternoon. As I sat with an old friend watching his university play cricket against my university, I suddenly became really interested.

http://p.imgci.com/db/PICTURES/CMS/128500/128530.jpg


My usual view of cricket is not too different from that of Malcolm Tucker’s (see bottom), but today was different. As one of the fielders missed an easy catch, my friend remarked that he would probably get a fine. 

A fine? Surely not! Is not cricket the gentleman’s game, played purely for the respect of other gentlemen? Apparently not. All the players are given a ‘fine’ if they do something stupid. 

The fines are reportedly handed out by general consensus, but the captain has a veto. The fines are then counted up and the value of the fines is decided at the end of the season (so that no-one faces a bill too high). 

Thus there is uncertainty about what doing something stupid will cost you, but you do know it will cost you. The cricketers were being incentivised to play well.

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Obviously, playing well already has the incentive of getting picked again, or winning the match, but clearly the university cricket powers think this is not enough. Apparently, the players needed more of an incentive to play well.

Monetary incentives are used all the time in Behavioural Economics (and all walks of life) to give people a motive for trying their best. It's interesting to see that even the venerable game of amateur cricket uses money likewise.


“Cricket? That’s the English equivalent of sport isn’t it? No actual physical contact; just glaring.” 
- Malcolm Tucker in The Thick Of It (BBC).


Recommended listening:
It’s The End Of The World As We Know It by R.E.M.

Tuesday 15 May 2012

Magic On The Internet – Don’t Stop Believin’

Continuing the auction theme, today we'll look at a genius study by an economist called David Lucking-Reiley. In the mid-nineties, just as online trade was really starting to take off, he analysed the sale of Magic:  the Gathering trading cards on the internet. His paper (published in AER, 1999) swiftly became a classic.
http://www.1zoom.net/big2/3/142632-stranger.jpg

Lucking-Reiley compared 4 different types of auction:

English
The most common type of auction. The bidding starts low and people make higher bids if they wish. The winner is the last surviving bidder. They win the prize and pay the winning bid.

Dutch
The starting price is set really high. It is then lowered bit by bit until someone bids. Thus the first bidder wins the prize and pays their entry price.

First Price Sealed Bid
This is not real-time. All bidders submit one bid (which is hidden from other bidders) within a set time frame. The highest bidder wins the prize and pays their bid.

Second Price Sealed Bid
Also not real-time. All bidders submit one bid (which is hidden from other bidders) within a set time frame. The highest bidder wins the prize but only pays the second highest bid.

(see last blog How To Design An Auction – Duel Of The Fates for slightly fuller descriptions).

According to the theory, the English and Second Price auctions should yield the same amount of revenue, likewise the Dutch and First Price Auctions.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/a7/Shadowmage_infiltrator.jpg

Lucking-Reiley initially spent $1,600 buying over 700 Magic cards. He then proceeded to sell them individually on a website devoted to trading the cards. People offered cards for sale in whatever way they liked, and a variety of different auction designs were already in use. Lucking-Reiley put up his cards for sale using the different auctions to see if they yielded the same price.

The website was already so popular (with over 20,000 messages per month) that Lucking-Reiley didn’t influence the market price. Because he didn’t tell anyone that it was an experiment he was able to accurately observe behaviour in the real world. 

The results were surprising. The English and Second Price Sealed Bid auctions were roughly the same, but the Dutch auction raised 30% more revenue on average than the First Price Sealed Bid auction.

http://mirpg.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/magic1.jpg

Thus if you are going to auction something, use the Dutch Auction rather than the First Price Sealed Bid. However, the experiment didn’t test to see whether the Dutch auction raised more than the English or Second Price Sealed Bid; sadly we can’t conclude which auction is best overall.

Despite this, the paper is still brilliantly innovative. David Lucking-Reiley was one of the first economists to use the web to observe how we behave. Crucially, he did so without having remove people from real life and put them in a lab (which could potentially alter behaviour). 

He also made a profit of $400. Lucky him!

Recommended listening:
Don’t Stop Believin’ by Journey

Monday 14 May 2012

How To Design An Auction - Duel Of The Fates

Just in case any of you are going to be holding an auction anytime soon, I thought I'd better do some kick ass auction economics.

Auctions are everywhere. eBay. Sotheby's. Daytime TV (a big shout out to all you arts students). They can raise huge sums of money; the UK Government got a massive £20 billion when it auctioned off mobile phone spectrum rights a few years ago.

As we saw in a previous blog (The £1 Coin Auction – Money For Nothing) auction design can be very important. Today I shall focus on 4 key types. My next blog will look at a genius experiment that used the internet to see which auction design would be the best to use.

I should start by explaining that I'll call the difference between the sum of money someone actually pays for the auction prize and their valuation of the prize a ‘surplus’. For example, if I pay £10 for GuruHogg t-shirt (no doubt coming soon to an internet near you) but am willing to pay up to £25 for it, then I have earned a surplus of £15. (We assume no-one is willing to pay over their valuation).

http://emptyhomes.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/30auctions_600.jpg

English Auction
This will be very familiar to you, it’s the most common type of auction; used in antique and art auctions worldwide. The bidding starts low and people make higher bids if they wish. The winner is the last surviving bidder. They win the prize and pay the winning bid. 

People will be prepared to bid anything up to their valuation; however, the highest bid will just be marginally more than the runner up’s highest bid. 

Dutch Auction
This is another real-time auction. However, in a Dutch auction the starting price is set really high. It is then lowered incrementally until someone bids. Thus the first bidder wins the prize and pays their entry price.

In this type of auction there is an incentive to wait until the price has been lowered below your valuation, in order to earn a surplus.

http://static.ddmcdn.com/gif/fcc-auction-2.jpg

First Price Sealed Bid Auction
This is not real-time. All bidders each submit one bid (which is hidden from other bidders) within a set time frame. The highest bidder wins the prize and pays their bid.

There is an incentive to bid slightly less than your valuation to earn a surplus.

Second Price Sealed Bid Auction
This is another sealed bid auction. All bidders each submit one bid (which is hidden from other bidders) within a set time frame. The highest bidder wins the prize but only pays the runner up’s bid.

Thus there is an incentive to bid your highest valuation (to try and win the prize) in the knowledge that you can still earn a surplus (because you'll pay the runner up’s bid).

http://aaciblog.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/aaci-auction1.jpg

Economists say that the English and Second Price Sealed Bid Auctions are 'strategically equivalent' because people follow the same strategy (because there is an incentive to pay, or be prepared to pay, one’s valuation of the prize). Likewise, the Dutch and First price Auctions are strategically equivalent (because in both there is an incentive to bid less than one’s valuation).

However, in theory economists reckon that all 4 auctions should yield the same sum of money to the seller. The key words here are in theory.

Next time: which auction would actually earn you more money??


Recommended listening:
Duel Of The Fates by John Williams

Friday 11 May 2012

Mood Matters – Feeling Good

http://www.techno-lovers.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Samsung-Patented-Emoticon.gif


A recent Facebook conversation got me thinking.

My friend had just done the Common Ratio Effect experiment (see previous blog: Are You Consistent? - Mad World), and was pleased that she had been consistent. However in relation to her answers, she noted that:

“lol... depends on circumstances...”

Which is true. Our answers one minute may vary wildly from the next minute. One day we may be feeling positive and more prone to taking risks, another day we may be more conservative and risk-averse. 

So, therefore, aren’t experiments a load of rubbish? Surely they can’t capture human behaviour accurately, because human behaviour is inherently dependent on our mood?

However, economists solve this problem by repeating the experiments on lots and lots of people (and use different experiments to see if phenomena are ‘robust’). Thus any mood variability should balance out over large populations. And remember, economists test to see if an aspect of behaviour can be shown to be systematic among us humans which does not usually require literally everyone to exhibit it. Anomalies are allowed. It does not matter if you answer differently according to how you feel because an experiment will never rely on your answers alone.

There are other criticisms of experiments (which will have to wait for another blog), but the “it all depends on how I feel” objection, while being absolutely correct, does not actually challenge the validity of experiments.

Recommended listening:
Feeling Good by Nina Simone

Thursday 10 May 2012

Are You Consistent? - Mad World

Let’s do an experiment to see whether your preferences comply with traditional economic theories. 
 
There are two choices to make; neither affects the other in any way.

Choice 1:

Payoff
Probability of getting Payoff (if not get nothing)
A
£5,000
100%
B
£7,000
60%

Which would you prefer, A or B?

Choice 2:

Payoff
Probability of getting Payoff (if not get nothing)
C
£5,000
25%
D
£7,000
15%

Which would you prefer, C or D?

People commonly choose A and D (I did this too). However, this is inconsistent with traditional economic assumptions about how people behave.

This is because we can easily ‘scale-down’ Choice 1 to make it Choice 2 without changing the relative probabilities. 100 and 60 divided by 4 equal 25 and 15, respectively. Given that Choice 1 and Choice 2 are the same in relative terms economists say that to choose A and D is inconsistent .

It is assumed that any common components of gambles are irrelevant for preferences over the gambles. This is called The Common Ratio Effect (after Mr Common Ratio, presumably).

An important area of Behavioural Economics is discovering where we don’t comply with traditional assumptions about economic agents. The hard bit is incorporating our little foibles into the rest of economics.

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Recommended listening:
Mad World by Gary Jules

Monday 7 May 2012

Anchors – The Chain

  • Is Wayne Rooney 45 years old?
  • How old is Wayne Rooney?

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01837/wayne-rooney_1837352b.jpg

The answer is... 

26 (b. 1985), hair transplant aside.

It’s very likely (although you may struggle to believe it) that your guess was affected by the number 45 in the first question. The number 45 acted as an ‘anchor’.

The theory goes as thus: in your thinking you started by briefly considering whether Rooney is 45 (clearly not). Then you adjusted down until you reached a reasonable figure, and settled on that being your guess. If the age in the first question was 15 you would have started by considering whether Rooney is that young (again, clearly not). You would then have adjusted up until you reached a reasonable figure.

In 1974 two Israeli psychologists named Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman published an article called ‘Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (a heuristics is just a ‘rule of thumb’). It was a seminal work which demonstrated how people make systematic errors.  One of their key findings was that when people estimate something unknown, they start at an initial point and then adjust their answer. But people systematically use insufficient adjustment from that starting point: thus there is a ‘bias’ towards the initial point.

Even if we are made aware of the fact that anchors have an effect, and even if the anchor is plainly ridiculous, we are unable to completely rid ourselves of this bias. For example, anchoring may have an effect on your following answers

  • Has Wayne Rooney scored 10,000 goals for Manchester United?
  • How many goals has Wayne Rooney scored for Manchester United?

Aside from the obvious own goal that is his hair, he’s scored (as of April 2012) 180 goals for Man U.

Given that you are probably not reading this while on a TV quiz game show you would be forgiven for thinking ‘so far, so irrelevant’. 

But it might interest you to know that shops have been using anchors for years. Ever wondered why the most expensive car is the first thing you see when you enter the showroom? Or why the most expensive house is on the cover of the real estate magazine?

They’re trying to influence your estimate of what a reasonable price is by anchoring your mind at their highest price (i.e. an expensive convertible makes everything else look like a bargain). That way, you buy more expensive stuff. Clever eh?

So the next time you shopping don’t be influenced by the highest price in the shop. It's just a trick!


Footnote: 
Confusingly, in a chandlery an anchor may not be an anchor while literally anything that clearly isn’t an anchor could be an anchor. Funny old world.


Recommended listening:
The Chain by Fleetwood Mac

Sunday 6 May 2012

What Motivates You? – The Bad, The Ugly and The Good

Economists categorise what motivates people into 3 broad categories, which I will call Bad, Ugly and Good.

http://postercabaret.com/media/catalog/product/a/l/alamogoodbadugly_8.jpg

The Bad: Narrow material self-interest. People are only motivated by getting more. More money, more leisure time, more stuff.

The Ugly: Broad self-interest as well as material self-interest. People are motivated by achieving higher status, fame, or better reputation.

The Good: People are also motivated to improve other people’s well-being, be it material or otherwise. This could be because being richer than someone else causes embarrassment. Or it could be pure altruism.

What motivates you?

Obviously, this is not an experiment. Experiments are unbiased and intended to observe behaviour, not influence it. My intention here is just to provoke some thought. What are you living for?

Recommended listening:
The Good, The Bad And The Ugly by Ennio Morricone

Saturday 5 May 2012

The £1 Coin Auction – Money For Nothing

We in Behavioural Economics use experiments to discover how people think. The way you design an experiment matters. Here’s a fun illustration: the £1 coin auction.


http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01380/PoundCoins_1380993c.jpg
1) Traditional Auction

This will be very familiar to you, it’s the most common type of auction; used in antique and art auctions worldwide. 

The bidding starts at 1p and people make higher bids if they wish. The winner wins the £1 coin and pays the winning bid. For example, 1p might be followed a bid of 2p, which might be followed by 3p etc etc. 

Obviously, the highest bid anyone would be prepared to bid will be 99p (or £1 if someone doesn’t mind making no gain).


2) New Auction Design

This time I will introduce a new rule; the winner wins the £1 coin and pays their winning bid, AND the person who bid the second highest amount pays their highest bid despite not winning anything.

Wanna guess what the highest bid is likely to be?

It depends on how many people bid. If only one person bids then obviously they win the £1 coin and they pay their only bid. If, however, another person enters the auction it starts to get interesting...

If the opening bid was 1p, the second bid would have to be at least 2p, and so on. Eventually the highest bid would reach 99p. Because the second highest bidder will have to pay their bid anyway, it would be worth bidding £1. 

Then, the person who bid 99p would have an interesting decision. If they don’t bid any higher and accept defeat they will lose 99p for no gain. If they bid 101p for the £1 coin then they will still have a net loss, but only 1p. Thus they will bid 101p.

You can probably see where this is going now. There is no logical maximum price, as it always slightly less bad to bid slightly higher. If I actually ran this experiment for real I could make millions (or at least the price would go up until someone decided enough was enough).

In conclusion, experiment design matters. 

More importantly, you now have a cast iron way of scamming your mates. £1 coin auction anyone??


Relevant listening:
Money For Nothing by Dire Straights

Friday 4 May 2012

Preference Reversal – I Need A Dollar

As we discovered last time, for traditional economics relies upon economic agents being consistent and thus rational. Today we will uncover a common phenomenon: preference reversal.


Let’s start with a little experiment...


You have a choice. There are two options of differing payoff and probability. Imagine that you, the subject, will get to keep any payoff you get. I, the experimenter, will pick a ball at random from a bag (a la bingo) to decide whether you are awarded any payoff. If you choose Option A I will use a set of balls that give you a 70% chance of getting the payoff (of £24), if you choose Option B I will use a set of balls that give you a 25% chance of getting the payoff (of £80).



Probability
Payoff
Option A
0.7
£24
Option B
0.25
£80



  • If you had to choose between them, which option would you rather have?

  • Now think about how much each option is worth to you: what amount of money would be of equal value as each option? (What would you deem a fair price for each option to be?)


If you’re anything like me you will have chosen Option A. You may also have valued Option A at something like £17 and Option B at around £20. 


And if you did, you were irrational. 


Why? Because you said you prefer the Option A in the straight choice, but value Option B higher. This is inconsistent. We can infer that you both prefer Option A and Option B (because you valued it at a greater sum of money). You have ‘reversed’ your preferences. This is ‘standard preference reversal’ (‘non-standard’ is where someone chooses Option B, but values Option A higher). PR is asymmetric; the overwhelming majority of preference reversals are the standard type.


If you were inconsistent, don’t worry, you are not alone. If you were consistent you are probably smug, well done. 


Preference reversal (PR) is the phenomenon where individuals change what they say they prefer, purely because the way they were asked was different. Interestingly, people change their preferences in a highly predictable, yet irrational, way. 


The psychologists Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) first demonstrated PR using their, now famous, experiment design (as roughly replicated above). They called Option A the ‘P-bet’ and Option B the ‘$-bet’.


The first economists to take notice of PR were David Grether and Charles Plott in 1979. They set out to ‘discredit’ the psychologists findings. They failed. Badly. After testing 13 theories they were forced to conclude that PR was not caused by flawed research. My favourite of their theories include:


Theory 12: The original experiments were done on psychology students who are ‘unsophisticated subjects’.


Theory 13: The original experiments were done by psychologists ‘who have a reputation for deceiving subjects’


Alas, it turns out that PR is real and here to stay. We will explore the causes of PR in later blogs, but the debate is basically between economists and psychologists over whether it is inherently daft to assume that people have underlying preferences. Psychologists argue that we only ‘construct’ preferences when we face decisions, while economists argue that our preferences already exist and we just refer to them.


I will finish by giving an example of PR in the real world (controversial, I know)...


http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2012/1/31/1328027920111/high-speed-train-Eurostar-007.jpg


Imagine you own a sheep farm in the Chiltons. However, the Government wants to build a high-speed rail link right through your land. The new line can either go straight past your delightful little cottage (causing you a big headache), or it can take a longer route going through your fields (taking up more of your prime sheep farming land). The Government wants to know which route you’d prefer. They can either ask you which option you would chose in a straight choice, or they can ask you how much compensation you will demand for each option (and choose the cheapest). Governments worldwide use both methods of asking people all the time, assuming they yield the same preference. 


PR would suggest that they might not...


Recommended listening:
I Need A Dollar by Aloe Blacc

Thursday 3 May 2012

Why Bother Voting? – Sunny Afternoon

Today is polling day in the UK, millions will be voting in local elections and referenda. The French are currently voting for their next president and Americans will be doing likewise in the autumn. 

But on an individual level, why do we all bother?

caphttp://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/About/General/2010/4/2/1270211485928/A-ballot-box-001.jpg

We tend to do stuff (in life generally) if the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. But the expected benefits of voting are basically zero, and the costs aren’t negligible. Your benefit from voting depends on whether your vote influences the outcome of the election. We can crudely estimate your benefit from voting by multiplying the probability that your vote will change the election outcome by the benefit you would gain from your preferred candidate winning. But the probability of you being the decisive voter is TINY (even in marginal constituencies). Thus the benefit from voting is negligible.

Given that there will be a cost to you of voting (taking time to think about policies and go to the polling station etc) we can rightly pose the question: why do we, rational, intelligent human beings, bother voting?

“The rationality of voting is the Achilles’ heel of rational choice theory” (Aldrich, 1997)

Many have attempted to answer that question by adding another ingredient into the mix: the direct benefit to you from voting, irrespective of who wins. This solves the puzzle. Or does it? Without adequately explaining exactly what this direct benefit is and what causes it, all we have is a typical economics fudge.

Some have suggested that the direct benefit is the knowledge that we are fulfilling our civic duty, or that we value being able to voice our opinions, even if it won’t change the election outcome.

One economist, Patricia Funk (2010), thought that the social pressure to vote might have an impact. She analysed the effect of introducing postal voting in Switzerland. Postal voting reduces the social pressure to vote (as you do not have to be seen down the polling station by your community). If this hypothesis is correct then we would expect to see the absence of postal voting lowering turnout in small communities more than in large ones (as everybody knows everybody in a small village etc). This is what she observed. However, there has to be more to puzzle than social pressure, as most people still voted using postal votes.

I will be voting later this evening, and I encourage all you (who can) to do so too. Personally, I think the civic duty suggestion is most accurate but I would be interested to hear your thoughts.

So, why did you/will you vote today?

Social pressure, civic duty or something else? 

Please leave a comment...


Recommended listening:
Sunny Afternoon by The Kinks

Wednesday 2 May 2012

Behavioural Economics – What A Wonderful World

Welcome to the world of Behavioural Economics: where Economics meets Psychology and stays for nice little chat, taking a comfy seat by the warming fireside of experimental evidence, holding a hot mug of pure rationality. Hmmm... rationality. The oil that makes the world go round.

Or does it?

Behavioural Economics is the area of study devoted to the exploration of how economic agents (that you and me folks) think, act and react. Put simply: are we rational? Rationality is where people have consistent preferences, and that from any given range of options, people always chose the one they most prefer.

In 1971 two psychologists named Sarah Litchenstein and Paul Slovic stumbled upon a phenomenon that was to rock the economics world: preference reversal. Preference reversal challenges an assumption economists make every day: that economic agents (still talking about you and me) are consistent. If we are not then the cornerstone of microeconomics is compromised.

This is because the accuracy of economic models hinges on whether they are able to predict human behaviour. If we are systemically inconsistent, and thus irrational, economists need to be able to ‘model’ this behaviour. Traditionally, however, economists have circumvented this problem by, well, ignoring it.

Enter stage left, Litchenstein and Slovic. The subject of preference reversal will be my next blog, where we will discover that we are not as logical as we like to think. So for now all we shall note is that it got the attention of economists who, since then, have being trying to define our irrationality and incorporate it into their models.

But why does any of this actually matter?

Because economic models are highly influential. Interest rates, Government spending and taxation are all set according to economic models that are built on the assumption of rationality.

So it’s important, but why should you bother with it?

Because it affects the decisions you make every day: what you say you prefer, what you buy and how much effort you put in at work. Furthermore, companies are starting to wake up to Behavioural Economics and are attempting to use it to manipulate economic agents (still us) to buy their stuff.

You still may not be concerned by that. Which is fine. But then, are you sure you’re rational?


Recommended listening:
What A Wonderful World by Louis Armstrong