Sunday, 20 October 2013

How not to play Poker

Demonstrating that behavioural economists are no more rational than anyone else I committed the same mistake playing poker that I did about a year ago...


I acted irrationally by seeing different colour chips as qualitatively different as well as quantitatively different. Despite the fact that one black chip was worth five white chips, I preferred betting five white chips than one black chip because I saw the higher value black chips as in some way better. This led me to be more risk averse when I had lost my white chips and had only black chips to bet.

Because I saw equivalent amounts of money as different I acted in a non-fungible manner. I'm not blaming this violation of fungibility for my poor performance (I lost, badly) but I am surprised to see myself commit the exact same mistake that I even wrote a blog about before. Some people never learn...

Thursday, 10 October 2013

Little Jimmy

The 4G auction in the UK used a highly complex mechanism called the combinatorial clock auction. Here is  a simple example of how an combinatorial auction works (using the the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule).

Little Jimmy has two chickens to sell. His friends are little Dave, little Fred and big Phil. Little Dave wants one chicken and is prepared to pay £5 for it. Little Fred wants one chicken and is prepared to pay £3 for it. Big Phil wants both chickens for a total of £7, but it not prepared to buy just one on its own.

How do we decide who gets the chickens? How do we create an auction where Dave, Fred and Phil have an incentive to bid their maximum valuation?


Answer: Maximise the value of the bids and make the winners pay the opportunity cost of winning. (Price = total bids of all winning bids if winner didn't bid - total bids of all other winning bids)...

We maximise the sum of the bids by having little Dave and little Fred winning one chicken each. But how much do they pay?
 
Dave: Fred is the other winner with utility £3. If Dave was removed Phil would win both with £7. (7-3=4)

Fred: Dave is the other winner with utility £5. If Fred was removed Phil would win both with £7. (7-5=2)

Therefore...

Little Dave wins one chicken and pays £4

Little Fred wins one chicken and pays £2

Big Phil wins nothing. Big Phil is sad. Big Phil is slightly less big now.

Friday, 4 October 2013

The Stable Marriage Problem

How does one go about matching husbands with wives?

Is there a way to do it that will result in stable marriages? 



If we define stable marriages as the situation where no couple would prefer each other to their current partner, then the answer is yes: a stable matching does exist. We can create a situation where no new couple would be created at the cost of a current couple.

Let's say there is a finite number of singles, who all go to a dance together.

We now use something called the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale & Shapely, 1962):

Step 1. Each man proposes to his preferred woman.

Step 2. Each woman records all the men who propose to her.

Step 3. Each woman then rejects all the men except her most preferred suitor.

Step 4. Each rejected man then proposes to his next most preferred woman.

Step 5. Repeat Step 2 onwards until all men and/or all women are matched.


Ta da! We have a stable matching. There is no new couple that could be created. If a man preferred a different woman to his partner, well, the woman would already have rejected him.

Romance versus efficiency: which will win??

Sunday, 29 September 2013

Blackberry Crumble

On Monday Blackberry announced it had provisionally accepted a bid from the Canadian private equity firm Fairfax Financial Holdings worth $9 (U.S.) a share, only 6% of the peak share price recorded in June 2008. Why has Blackberry, a firm with operations in 175 countries, $2.8bn in cash and whose corporate clients amount to 90% of the Fortune 500 been forced to accept such an offer?


Fundamentally, Blackberry misread market trends and did not follow consumer demand. It stood still while competitors HTC, Samsung and most notably Apple reshaped the mobile handset market. Blackberry isn't the only firm which failed to adapt (remember Nokia?) but its decline is swift and coming to a head. So why did Blackberry become so big in the first place?

Blackberry rapidly gained market share by doing two things really well. It had the best security and the best instant messaging system (BBM). This made it the favourite of both governments and corporate IT departments across the globe, whilst also appealing to young people who quickly became attached to BBM. However, Blackberry neglected three key trends in consumer demand.


Firstly, Blackberry ignored the fact that consumers want something fun, not just functional. It dismissed touch screens as unnecessary, not grasping that people found them alluring and  engaging enough to pay for. Blackberry has now brought out some touch screen models, but they have performed poorly and are too little too late. Blackberry continued catering for those few who saw buttons as indispensible while ignoring the direction of the rest of the market.

Secondly, Blackberry handsets are not sufficiently App friendly. Handsets were incapable of hosting Apps as recent as 2009, and even now there is a greatly reduced variety of available Apps. It almost goes without saying that fans of Apps do not buy Blackberry handsets. Again Blackberry found itself forgetting that consumers expect to enjoy using their phones. Ironically, one of the few Apps available on the Blackberry operating system is WhatsApp, an App that has done more than any other to erode the status of BBM as the best instant messaging service.


Thirdly, the recent trend of bring your own device (BYOD) has wrong-footed the Blackberry business model of appealing to IT departments. With employees often deciding which handset they use, security is no longer king in the corporate handset market leaving Blackberry out in the cold.

In summary, Blackberry had a winning formula but refused to adapt the formula in the face of significant trends in demand. Blackberry is now about to be taken into private ownership where it can be reshaped with less public scrutiny. This reshaping is widely predicted to involve turning Blackberry into a niche handset maker for the corporate world, and with large reserves of cash and intellectual property, there is an opportunity here. If Blackberry can adapt to key consumer demand trends, once again the future could be bright.